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ABSTRACT 
To understand disruptions and their propagation along the supply chains is becoming critical for designing competitive 
global supply chains operating in emerging economies. It leads to economic damages to every organization involved 
in a supply chain, but it also decreases national logistics competitiveness. This research provides numerical elements 
in terms of significance of the security issue in Latin America, and at the same time, proposes a system dynamics 
assessment model based on real-life information, able to establish analysis scenarios in order to measure the impacts 
derived of supply chain disruptions propagation caused by criminal acts. Finally, useful conclusions for designing 
more resilient supply chains and future research are exposed. 
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RESUMEN
Entender las disrupciones y su propagación a lo largo de las cadenas de suministro se ha vuelto crítico para el diseño 
de cadenas de suministro globales operando en economías emergentes. Esto no solo implican pérdidas económicas 
a cualquier organización involucrada en una cadena de suministro, sino que además disminuye la competitividad 
logística nacional. Este trabajo provee elementos numéricos de la importancia de la seguridad en América Latina y al 
mismo tiempo, propone un modelo de evaluación desde la metodología de dinámica de sistemas con base en 
información real, capaz de establecer escenarios para medir los impactos relacionados de la propagación de 
interrupciones en la cadena de suministro causados por actos criminales. Finalmente, se presentan conclusiones 
para el diseño de cadenas de suministro más resilientes, así como propuestas de investigación futura. 


1. Introduction 
 
To develop timely efficient flow of legitimate goods 
while reducing its vulnerability to disruptions is one 
of the main goals of the most important export-
oriented economies. However, security is a critical 
issue for designing supply chains process. 
Particularly in emerging countries, supply chain 
performance has become a significant issue, which 
has been analyzed by several authors [1, 2]. In 
fact, due to the potentially damaging social and 
economic effects of supply chain disruptions 
caused by criminal acts, security is compromising 
the competitiveness of certain nations in Latin  
 
 
 
 
America (LatAm) [3]. Hence, the security risk has 
pernicious effects on the economy, decreasing 
competitiveness, national and foreign investment, 
as well as employment and productivity by making 
consumer products more expensive due to the 
extra costs involved. 
 
According to Perez-Salas [3] as well as Bueno-
Solano and Cedillo-Campos [4], disruptions in 
supply chains have enormous economic 
consequences not only by its direct damages, but 
also by the propagation effect to the rest of the  
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supply chain. In fact, it reduces logistics reliability,  
which, results in long lead times and stimulates 
larger safety stocks, among other factors 
decreasing national logistics competitiveness [5].  
 
Although thefts have always been a risk in the 
transportation sector, globalization and the 
prevalent paradigm looking for designing 
integrated, faster and cost-efficient supply chains, 
have provided an operational environment 
susceptible to disturbances that can rapidly 
escalade from localized events to major 
disruptions [6]. 
 
Several authors [4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] agree that 
there is no evidence in the literature of quantitative 
models to dynamically compute the propagation 
effect of disruptive phenomena at multiple stages of 
the supply chain. The aim of this article is to 
propose a system dynamics model based on real-
life information, able to establish analysis scenarios 
in order to measure the impact regarding cost and 
service level in global supply chains, as a result of 
the disruptive propagation effect caused by criminal 
acts. Thus, from a global perspective of risk, our 
results provide information about the propagation of 
risks and costs, which can be used by decision 
makers during the proactive planning process. 
 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a general background of risk 
factors that currently threaten global supply chains 
as well as an analysis of LatAm current status in 
terms of security. Section 3 describes the model 
developed, based on real-life information. In 
Section 4, the results obtained through the 
simulation of different policies and decision 
scenarios will be discussed. Finally, Section 5 
presents conclusions and future research. 
 
2. Background 
In addition to direct losses from crimes, costs 
related to the incidents (attorney fees, delays in 
collecting insurance, etc.), as well as significant 
national productivity losses end up making exports 
and imports more expensive. Simultaneously, the 
image of the country is also seriously damaged by 
crime, which discourages new domestic 
investment and makes the country less attractive 
to foreign investors. 
Thus, mitigation of supply chain disruptions caused 
by criminal acts requires a coordinated approach 
between the public and the private sector. Since 
supply chain disruptions directly impact the 
competitiveness of an economy, governments are 
responsible for providing the infrastructure and 
services needed to ensure an acceptable level of 
security as well as guaranteeing the proper 
functioning of transport infrastructure services 
(safety) under normal conditions as well as during 
disruptive events. On the other hand, companies 
are responsible for implementing internal security 
procedures to mitigate risk [3]. 
 
As several authors argue [3, 6, 13, 14,], LatAm 
countries with better security performance are also 
more competitive. In this sense, inside the upper 
left of figure 1, are located seven of the ten most 
competitive countries in the region where the 
frequency of crime and violence against firms is 
low (Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Panama, Uruguay). Inside the upper right 
quadrant, there is a group of countries within good 
level of competitiveness at a regional level, but 
their low performance in terms of security reduce 
their potential competitiveness (Colombia, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago). The 
lower left quadrant show countries with relative 
good competitiveness and satisfactory level of 
security (Argentina, Bolivia, Guyana, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Surinam). However in this group are 
located some countries where there is no reliable 
statistical data of cargo theft. Finally, inside the 
lower right quadrant are the nations with a 
competitive performance below the regional 
average and where the cost of crime and violence 
is lower than the regional average (Ecuador, Haiti 
Honduras, Jamaica, El Salvador, Venezuela). 
 
Since supply chain disruption propagation is 
multidimensional, decision-makers do not count 
with a clear view on how to face and deal with 
disruptions [4, 15]. According to Sodhi et al. and 
Waters [11, 12], the fundamental basis of 
complexity when analyzing risk propagation is due 
to the fact that it can manifest itself in many 
different ways, virtually affecting any link along the 
supply chain. This is also identified by Wu et al. [7], 
who highlight the understanding of risk propagation 
in the supply chain as prerequisite for an effective 
integration of supply chains. 
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Several authors [16, 17, 18, 19] argue that supply 
chain disruption analysis should not focus on the 
specific nature of the disruption because decision 
makers cannot foresee every potential threat 
neither determine how likely that threat could 
materialize. Other authors [4, 8, 20] suggest to 
dynamically analyze if the effects of disruptions 
have local influence or if they may propagate to 
other members of the supply chain. 
 
Thus, due to many interrelated variables involved 
in the analysis of disruptions in global supply 
chains, the systemic perspective provided by 
system dynamics methodology becomes critical. 
3. System Dynamics Model 
 
After a detailed analysis, the multiple relationships 
between the different supply chain echelons 
allowed us to identify a refined basic logistics 
structure. Then, a supply chain model was built 
based on real-life information obtained from the 
case study presented and analyzed by Cedillo-
Campos et al. [21]. This case analyzed a supply 
chain organized around the following basic 
components: (a) A raw materials supplier; (b) A 
Tier 1 supplier; (c) An international border; (d) A 
buffer inventory managed by the Tier 1 supplier; 
and (e) A manufacturing facility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At that research step, other significant real-life 
variables were identified, and as result, two basic 
subsystems were recognized. The first one, a 
reinforcing loop, which was related to the demand 
process, and the second one, a balancing loop, 
which was related to the supply process as 
described as follows:
 
• Customer Demand (Ds): It is the customer 
demand for each corresponding period (s), where 
s=1…180 periods and si-1 represent the demand 
of the previous period. 
 
• Total Orders Placed (TOP): It is the total demand 
to be sorted by the inventory level and is 
calculated as: 
 
TOP = Ds + OB                    (1)
 
• Order Backlog (OB): It is the amount of orders 
that are still outstanding to be delivered to the 
client and is computed as: 
 
OB = Ds – GSC                                                     (2)
 
• Goods Shipped to Customer (GSC): It is the 
amount of goods sent in each period to the instant 
client. GSC is computed as:   
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between Global Competitiveness Index and the cost of crime  
and violence for the companies (2012-2013) [2]. 
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GSC = min (IL, TOP, MGS)   (3) 
 
 
Where MGS is the maximum capacity of goods to 
move from one stage to another and is set in ±33% 
of Ds units. 
 
• Inventory Level (IL): It is the behavior of the stock 
level for each stage of the supply chain. IL is 
calculated using: 
 
IL= ITI-GSC     (4) 
 
• In Transit Inventory (ITI): It is the amount of 
inventory in transit. It represents GSC of the upper 
echelon. ITI is computed as: 
 
ITI = TBD-GSC     (5)
• Total Buffer Demand (TBD): represents the total 
period demand. TBD is determined by the following 
equation adapted from Rong et al. [23]: 
 
TBD = max(0, г + Į(SS–IL) + ȕ(DITI –IP – IL))
(6)
 
Where IP is the inventory position and is calculated 
as follows: 
 
IP = ITI – IL     (7) 
 
෡represents a forecast of demand and is 
calculated: 
 
۽෡ = n ۽෡si-1 + (1-n) ۽෡si-1    (8) 
 
•.Safety Stock (SS): It is the desired IL. It helps you 
make the adjustments necessary to maintain the 
desired inventory level to avoid it growing or drop 
without control. 
 
• Desired in Transit Inventory (DITI): It is the 
desired level of inventory in transit. It helps make 
the adjustments necessary to maintain the level of 
desired in ITI. 
 
According to Rong [22], n is the demand smoothing 
factor 0<࢔ <1. As in our model the demand 
distribution is known, it is not necessary to compute 
a forecast of n and then: 
 
۽෡ ൌ ۽෡si-1=Dsi-1     (9) 
The constants Į and ȕ are parameters controlling 
the change in the TBD when the actual inventory 
level and the supply line, respectively deviate from 
their desired levels. For this research, Į=0.1 and 
ȕ=0.2 
 
3.1 Dynamic hypothesis 
 
In the causal loop diagram (see figure 2), two 
processes that turn around IL are identified. There 
is the loop of demand, which has a positive polarity 
(+) and is identified in the causal loop diagram as 
R1, R2 and R3. We can also see a loop of supply 
process represented by B1 and B3 which also 
integrate respectively a sub process corresponding 
to the in transit inventory (ITI), represented by B2 
and B4. These last four causal loops have a 
negative polarity (-) balancing the desired level of 
inventory. The first goal corresponding to B1 and 
B3 is to maintain the inventory level around SS, 
seeking to avoid breakdowns by shortage of 
inventory in the supply chain. Therefore, the goal of 
B2 and B4 helps to maintain the supplier line 
stable, preventing the shortages of goods. This is 
accomplished by comparing the DITI with the IL 
represented by the “buffer in transit inventory”.
In the reinforcing causal loops R1, R2 and R3, we 
can note that TOP is positively influenced by Ds, 
and the OB accumulated from previous periods. 
Likewise TOP has a negative relationship with the 
inventory level that is responsible for meeting the 
customer’s demand. GSC represents the amount of 
goods delivered to the client and is equivalent to 
the minimum amount of goods between total 
demand and the level of available inventory. Thus, 
backorders accumulate in OB. Finally the 
accumulation of back orders increases the amount 
of orders for the next period of time. This 
contributes to a self-reinforcing loop involving the 
inventory level and at the same time, reducing the 
growth of TOP.
Equally, causal loops B1 and B3 influence the level 
of inventory. As described above, balancing 
feedback leads to goal-seeking behavior. This 
condition maintains the level of inventory around a 
desired inventory level, which allows to constantly 
balancing the subsystem. While in loops R1, R2 
and R3, we note that IL decreases as goods are 
delivered to the client, we can now identify that IL  
increases as it receives ITI. This ITI actually 
  
SupplyChainDisruptionsPropagationCausedbyCriminalActs, M.G.CedilloͲCamposetal./684Ͳ694
Vol.12,August2014688
represents the goods that were delivered by the 
immediate provider to the client. Thus, if the ITI is 
high, the difference with respect to the level of SS 
and IL will be less. 
Likewise, causal loops B1 and B3 influence the 
level of inventory. This condition maintains the 
level of inventory around a desired inventory 
level, which allows it to constantly balance the 
subsystem. While in loops R1, R2 and R3, we 
note that IL decreases as goods are delivered to 
the client, we can now identify that IL increases 
as it receives ITI. This, in transit inventory, 
actually represents the goods that were 
delivered by the immediate supplier to the client. 
Thus, if the ITI is high, the difference with 
respect to the level of SS and IL will be smaller. 
 
This condition suggests that when fewer orders 
are placed to the supplier, then, the system will 
have a smaller amount of in transit inventory in 
the following period of time. Accordingly, when 
the IL receives fewer ITI (compared with the IL 
and the SS levels), then, there will be a bigger 
difference with respect to the desired level.  
 
Thus, the new condition generates a greater 
amount of orders being placed to the supplier, 
generating subsequently an increase of the IL. 
Consequently, the system is constantly balanced 
around the desired security level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Simulation Framework 
From a general point of view, it is important to 
hightlight that criminal gangs operating on the 
trucking sector do not recognize borders and are 
continually moving, looking for areas with lower 
security levels where their actions are facilitated. 
 
In this research the impacts of supply chain 
disruption propagation of security risks were 
measured as a result of inventory performance, 
and total costs. Within the costs analysis, we 
considered the costs of inventory management 
and costs of low order fullfilment rate, as well as 
the ones generated by the theft of goods. 
For the simulation process we evaluated 
performance of two different scenarios where the 
only variation was the lead time in order to 
quantitatively measure the effects of disruptions 
caused by criminal acts and their potential impact 
in the behavior of the inventory levels. 
 
The simulation of the model was carried out under 
STELLA 9.1.3, on a 180-day period of time 
corresponding to a six-month planning horizon. 
According to Sheffi [23] less-than-a-year planning 
periods, allow managers to incorporate flexibility into 
supply chain, and optimize operations. It should be 
noted that since daily orders were received, the 
interval of time between calculations “STEPTIME” 
equals one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic hypothesis. 
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To illustrate how uncertainty on crossing times 
affects the safety stock in a cross-border supply 
chain, we considered different scenarios. 
 
The manufacturer daily demand of this product 
(ȥ) was considered as an input to the model. This 
demand is represented by 1,296 units per day and 
a standard deviation of 50 units. In fact, the 
assembly plant requires to keep a 5-day safety 
stock in the ABC warehouse (buffer). At the same 
time, it was taken into account that the border 
crossing times vary from 1.77 hrs (best case) to 
16.77 hrs (worst case) [15,16]. The initial values 
for the simulation of the proposed model are 
shown in table 1. 
 
Our analysis considered simulating two different 
scenarios. In both cases it was necessary to keep 
a safety stock in the buffer on the US side. The 
first scenario, assumed that the MEX company is 
located in Mexico and four days are necessary to 
reach the inventory level, receiving components 
form the buffer located on the US side. Since the 
SS must cover at least five days of the customer 
demand, the average level of inventory must be of 
6,474 pieces.  
 
On the other hand, for the second scenario, the 
BRA Company is located in Brazil. It was 
estimated that seven days are necessary to reach 
the inventory level using the buffer to honor the 
assembly plant requirement of a 5 day safety 
stock. In that case, the level of average inventory 
in the buffer was set in 9,072 pieces. 
 
In both scenarios, the average flow of goods from 
buffer to customer (GSC) was 1,296 pieces. 
Under these conditions the baseline behavior of 
both scenarios shows a similar performance 
(figures 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Componen Supplier International Border Buffer (Warehouse)
ITI IL
Godos In 
Transit
Crossing 
Border 
Times
ITI IL
Initial Inventory (units) 
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
13
00
1300 
1450
1450
1300
1300
 
1296
6480
9072
Target Inventory 
Level 
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
13
00
13
00
1300
1450
1300
1300
6480
9072
Transit Time (day)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
1
4
Min  1.77 
hrs.
Max 16.77 
hrs.
2
2
Handle Cost (dlls) 2.5    5
Cost of IL Lost (dlls) 175    175
Cost of ITI Lost (dlls) 125      
 
Table 1. Supply chain values. 
 
  
SupplyChainDisruptionsPropagationCausedbyCriminalActs, M.G.CedilloͲCamposetal./684Ͳ694
Vol.12,August2014690
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Scenario 1 buffer IL baseline behavior vs Goods shipped to customer. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Scenario 2 Buffer IL baseline behavior vs Goods shipped to customer.
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The main difference was the total cost of every 
supply chain. In the Scenario 1 the cost of the 
supply chain was $6,621,350 US dollars and on 
the other hand, in the Scenario 2 the cost of the 
supply chain was $8,941,190 US dollars. It 
means that if we only focus on the lead time and 
consider that all the other parameters are alike, 
the difference between the two suply chains in 
total cost is around 35%.
 
4.1 Analysis under disruption scenarios 
 
In LatAm the in-transit inventory is the most 
vulnerable element in the supply chain. 
However, the lack of information about the real 
dimension of the problem of security makes it a 
low priority on the political agenda and is often 
seen as an “usual” cost of logistics activity. The 
lack of updated and standardized information for 
decision-making hinders a proactive risk 
management of gobal supply chains [3]. 
 
In fact, it was proved that there was not enough 
information available to simulate an entire case 
with real-life information. Consequently, for the 
Mexican case, we based our research work on a 
reliable database that belongs to the Mexican 
Association of Insurance Institutions (MAII). On 
the other hand, for the Brazilian case, we based 
it on statistics provided by World Bank (WB) as 
well as logistics magazines. 
 
Thus, we simulated three different situations for each 
of the two scenarios. Thus, in Scenario 1, a cargo 
robbery represented at least 6 days of disruption; this 
was because the baseline lead-time was of four 
days. If the criminal act occurred on the 3rd day, the 
supply chain would need at least other three days to 
recover a steady state. In Scenario 2, if a cargo 
robbery occurs on the 6th day, since the supply chain 
needs at least three days to recover a steady state, 
then the lead time changes from 7 to 9 days during a 
disruption. In both scenarios we considered that in a 
disruptive context the supplier used an air cargo 
shipment to fulfill the customer demand. As a result, 
we obtained two different impacts on the IL (see 
figure 5 and figure 6). Analyzing the inventory 
performance, our results quantitatively confirm the 
qualitative proposal by Sheffi [23]. 
 
For the Scenario 1 with a 6-day disruption, in the first 
phase, there is a period of "normal" operation before 
the impact. For this simulation the impact occurs in 
the 50th day, at an early stage. In a second phase, a 
delay effect affects the IL of the company. There is a 
gradual reduction of IL as a result of maintaining the 
flow of deliveries to the client, but without being 
restocked when the international border is closed. 
Finally, a third phase shows how the behavior of the 
IL regulates itself on day 110. In the case of the 
global manufacturer company in study, thanks to the 
coverage of 5 day inventory, the order backlog 
stayed in control and the customer demand could 
practically be fulfilled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Criminal act scenario 1. 
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Figure 6. Criminal act scenario 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Criminal act scenario 2 buffer IL behavior.
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For Scenario 2 with 9 days of disruption, we could 
verify, during the second phase, a breakdown of 
SS, and contrary to what was observed in the 
Scenario 1, the delivery of goods to the client was 
compromised by a lapse of 10 periods. The supply 
chain required 100 periods to reach a steady state.
As a result of failing to fulfill the demand, an 
increase in IL of 125% versus the baseline 
scenario was observed. A large volume of OB was 
also created (see figure 7), which led the supply 
system to increase the IL in 530%. This behavior in 
the IL was identified and studied by Sterman [24], 
who also shows that managers tend to pay more 
attention to back orders than to the supply line, 
placing very large orders to the supplier.
 
The cost of the total supply chain in the Scenario 1 
reaches $8,015,205 US dollars while in the 
Scenario 2; the total cost of the supply chain was 
increased to $19,780,320 US dollars. It means 
than the total cost rose to 21% and 121% in every 
case. This analysis helps us to understand why 
some companies prefer to operate in Mexico 
despite security risks.
 
5. Conclusions and further research 
 
Since there are different and interrelated impacts 
(social, political, and economic) related to supply 
chain disruptions caused by criminal acts, the topic 
is very complex. In order to provide useful insights, 
our research work was organized at two different 
levels: a) a global level looking for analyzing public 
policies; and b) a tactical level looking for designing 
a quantitative model to measure two real-life 
scenarios.
From a global perspective, this paper stated that 
citizen security is part of the current LatAm public 
policies which are oriented to stop crime and 
violence. However, until now, the initiatives are 
executed without integrated trade facilitation 
principles (harmonization, simplification, 
transparency and standardization), and an integral 
supply chain perspective, despite a significant 
relationship between supply chain security, total 
logistics costs and national competitiveness [3, 5]. 
Since security is a transnational issue, public 
coordination at a regional level as well as 
considering the supply chains as regional public 
goods is a fundamental approach in designing safer 
supply chains.
From a tactical perspective, this paper contributes 
to the research literature by measuring 
quantitatively what some authors proposed 
qualitatively [6, 18, 21]. As our research 
demonstrates, the lead-time can make the 
difference between an early recovery, and 
catastrophic and unrecoverable economic losses.  
 
As future research, the model herein proposed 
should be proved under other high impact 
scenarios such as natural disasters, which tend to 
propagate their disruptive effects along the supply 
chains. At the same time, it is suggested to analyze 
the perspective here discussed from an event 
management approach [25].
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